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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 870276-CA

v,
Category No. 2

LEE ALLEN AASE,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of attempted second
degree murder, a second degree felony, after a jury trial in the
Second Judicial District Court. This Court has jurisdiction to
hear the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. S 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the court properly deny defendant's motion for

a change of venue where defendant failed to demonstrate actual
prejudice resulting from adverse pretrial publicity?
2.

Must this Court affirm the lower court's ruling on

the admission of ammunition evidence where defendant did not
present the specific objection he raises on appeal to the trial
court?
3. Must this Court refuse to review defendant's claim
of an alleged violation of S 77-17-11 where defendant had failed
to raise the issue at trial?
4.

Was defendant adequately notified that the offense

was committed using a firearm where the probable cause statement
in the information alleged that he shot the victim?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Lee Allen Aase, was charged with attempted
second degree murder, a second degree felony, under UTAH CODE
ANN. SS 76-5-203 and 76-4-101 (1978 & Supp. 1987) (R. 60-64).
After a jury trial, he was convicted of that offense (R. 261).
The trial court sentenced him to the Utah State Prison for a term
of one to fifteen years on the second degree felony conviction
and a five year consecutive term for use of a firearm (R. 26869) .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The issues raised by defendant on appeal generally do
not require a recitation of facts beyond that contained in the
Statement of the Case.

Any additional factual development

necessary to the resolution of the issues appears in the argument
portion of this brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's motion for a change of venue was properly
denied prior to jury selection because it was premature.

Where

he failed to renew the objection after the court ruled that it
was premature and failed to show that the jury was prejudiced by
the allegedly prejudicial publicity he cannot prevail on appeal
on his claim that the motion should have been granted.
During trial, defendant objected to the admission of
evidence that defendant had previously used ammunition similar to
that used in the crime.

Defendant did not, however, object upon

the same grounds that he raises on appeal. Consequently, he
waived the objection.
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Defendant also failed to timely object to the fact that
the jury was permitted to adjourn for lunch unaccompanied by the
officer sworn to keep them together.

He cannot raise this issue

for the first time on appeal.
Finally, defendant's contention that was not adequately
notified in the information that the firearm enhancement
provision applied to him is baseless.

The probable cause

statement included several references to the fact that the victim
was "shot" with "bullets."

These references were sufficient to

notify defendant that a firearm was used in the crime.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN DENYING HIS MOTION FOR A
CHANGE OF VENUE.
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion for a change
of venue (R. 95). Upon defendant's request for a ruling on that
motion without a hearing (R. 120), the trial court denied it;
however, it stated that the motion could "be renewed at the time
of jury selection if a basis therefore [were] exhibited in the
jury selection process" (R. 122). Defendant did not renew his
venue motion at any time during or after jury selection, and
specifically passed the jury for cause (Transcr. of May 7, 1987
Proceedings at 4-80) .
On appeal, defendant appears to argue that the pretrial
publicity was so massive and prejudicial that it presumptively
denied him an impartial jury, and thus the trial court erred in
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refusing to grant a change of venue.1
In claiming that a venue change was required, defendant
makes no references to evidence of the pretrial publicity alleged
to have been present in his case.

Nor does he discuss in any

detail the extent or quality of that publicity.

In that the

burden is on defendant to show that pretrial news coverage has
generated community bias to such a degree that the right to a
fair and impartial trial has been put in jeopardy, State v. Woody
648 P.2d 71, 88 (Utah), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982); Utah
R. Crim. P. 29(e) (UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-29(e) (1982)), the
Court should reject defendant's claim of error on the basis that
he fails even to identify the publicity alleged to have been
present. A bare allegation of prejudice is patently inadequate to
justify a change of venue.

Wood. 648 P.2d at 88 (citing State v*

Gellatly. 22 Utah 2d 149, 449 P.2d 993 (1969)).
Furthermore, it is clear that the mere demonstration
that some dissemination of news, thought to be prejudicial to a
defendant, has occurred does not normally entitle the defendant
to prevail on a motion for a change of venue.

Wood, 648 P.2d at

89; State v. Pierre. 572 P.2d 1338, 1349-50 (Utah 1977), certdenied. 439 U.S. 882 (1978).

As noted in Wood:

"The more general showing of publicity
thought to be adverse to a party is not
sufficient to require a change of venue
except in the most extraordinary cases. In
1

Defendant does not appear to argue that the jury in his case
was actually prejudiced. Insofar as the argument in defendant's
brief could be construed as such a challenge, the issue of actual
prejudice was waived for appeal when defendant passed the jury
for cause in the trial court.
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the usual situation, the movant must at least
make a showing that the allegedly prejudicial
material reached the veniremen, so that a
foundation is laid for the possibility of
actual bias." Northern California
Pharmaceutical Association v. United States,
306 F.2d 379, 383 (9th Cir. 1962).
648 P.2d at 89 (footnote omitted).

In Codianna v. Morris, 660

P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983), the Court similarly observed:
An accused can be denied a fair trial
where the process of news-gathering is
allowed such a free rein that it intrudes
into every aspect of a trial and creates a
"carnival atmosphere" and where the publicity
is so weighted against the defendant and so
extreme in its impact that members of the
jury are encouraged to form strong
preconceived views of his guilt. Sheppard v.
Maxwell. 384 U.S. 333, 358, 86 S. Ct. 1507,
1519, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966). Nevertheless,
"pretrial publicity—even pervasive, adverse
publicity—does not inevitably lead to an
unfair trial." Nebraska Press Association v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554, 96 S. Ct. 2791,
2800, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976).
660 P.2d at 1111. Defendant fails to demonstrate that the trial
court was obligated to order a change of venue in light of this
case law.

He offers nothing to indicate that his case is

significantly different from two recent cases decided by the Utah
Supreme Court—State v. Bishop. 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 18-19,
P-2d

,

63,

P.2d

(1988); State v. Lafferty. 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 57,
,

(1988)—where the trial courts' refusals to

order a change of venue were upheld.
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POINT II
BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT MAKE A UTAH R.
EVID. 406 OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSION OF THE
AMMUNITION EVIDENCE AT TRIAL, THE COURT
SHOULD NOT CONSIDER HIS RULE 406 ARGUMENT ON
APPEAL; FURTHERMORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S
REFUSAL TO EXCLUDE THAT EVIDENCE UNDER UTAH
R. EVID. 401 AND 403 SHOULD BE UPHELD.
Defendant argues that the trial court admitted the
evidence of defendant's previous use of "snake shot" ammunition
in violation of Utah R. Evid. 406 which relates to habit or
routine practice.

However, defendant did not make a Rule 406

objection to that evidence at trial.

His only objection to the

challenged evidence was that it was "too far removed in time and
too prejudicial" (Transcr. of May 8, 1987 proceedings at 62-63).
The detailed Rule 406 analysis defendant presents on appeal was
never presented to the trial court.

Effectively, defendant made

only a Utah R. Evid. 401 relevance objection and a Utah R. Evid.
403 objection.

Having failed to make a specific Rule 406

objection below, defendant may not raise that objection and have
it considered for the first time on appeal.

State v. Loe» 732

P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1987); Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1).

See also

State v. Davis. 689 P.2d 5, 14 (Utah 1984) (a defendant must have
specifically stated to the trial court the same grounds for
objection to evidence presented on appeal).

And, as for the

trial court's rejection of defendant's relevancy and prejudice
objections, defendant fails to demonstrate that there are grounds
for reversal.

It is well settled that "the trial court's ruling

on the admissibility of evidence will not be reversed absent a
showing that the trial court so abused its discretion as to
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create a likelihood that injustice resulted."
710 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1985).

State v. Royball,

See also State v. Mildenhall, 747

P.2d 422, 425 (Utah 1987); Utah R. Evid. 103(a).

No such abuse

is apparent here.
POINT III
BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO TIMELY AND
PROPERLY OBJECT TO AN ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-17-11 (
) , BY THE
TRIAL JUDGE, THE COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER
THIS ALLEGATION ON APPEAL.
Defendant argues that he was unduly prejudiced when the
jury, during its deliberations, was permitted to adjourn for
lunch in the absence of the officer sworn to keep them together
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-17-11 U?*Z).

However, defendant

waived this objection by failing to object to this alleged
impropriety at trial.
time on appeal.

The issue is instead raised for the first

"In the absence of exceptional circumstances,

this Court has long refused to review matters raised for the
first time on appeal where no timely and proper objection was
made in the trial court."
(Utah 1983).

State v. Stegqell, 660 P.2d 252, 254

Defendant fails to show any exceptional

circumstances that would give rise for a review of this matter on
appeal.

Indeed, the trial court's strict instructions to the

jury "not to discuss the case with anyone, draw conclusions, or
read any newspapers or articles," (R. 83), safeguarded against
any likelihood of prejudicial exposure.
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POINT IV
THE STATE'S INFORMATION CLEARLY NOTIFIED
DEFENDANT OF ITS INTENTION TO RELY ON THE
FIREARMS ENHANCEMENT PROVISION OF UTAH CODE
ANN. S 76-3-203(2) (1983, as amended).
Defendant argues that the State's information failed to
notify him adequately of its intention to rely on the firearms
enhancement provision of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203(2).

Defendant

points out that the charging portion of the information contains
no allegations regarding the use of a firearm and does not cite
or refer to the statute.

This failure, concludes defendant,

violates fundamental fairness and due process of law under State
v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992 (Utah 1978).
State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) is
dispositive of defendant's argument.

Schreuder found that the

State's information provided defendant adequate notice of the
State's intention to rely on the firearms enhancement statute,
where, even though the charging portion of the information
contained no allegation regarding use of a firearm and did not
cite or refer to the statute, the probable cause statement which
was made part of the information stated that the victim "was shot
in the back and in the head by a weapon, determined to be a .357
magnum."

!£. at 272. Schreuder relied on section 77-35-4(b) of

the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that an
"information may contain or be accompanied by a statement of
facts sufficient to make out probable cause to sustain the
offense charged where appropriate."
In light of Schreuder. defendant's argument in this
case is without merit.

The probable cause statement, which is
-8-

found immediately below the information containing the statutory
charge of attempted criminal homicide, gives clear notice that
the attempt was committed with a deadly weapon.

Sentences 1-6,

8, 10, 20 and 21 of the probable cause statement all pertain to a
•shooting" or "shots" committed by defendant or a "bullet" and
that the caliber of the bullet was probably a .38 or .357 (R. 6064).

Consequently, this written notice on the face of the

information that the state intended to show a crime was committed
with the use of a firearm satisfies the requirements of Angus and
constitutional due process.

Schreuder at 273.
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